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NOTE
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The transfer of technology from industrial nations and multinational
corporations to developing countries is one of the key issues in economic
'and social development of the Third World. In the last few years there
has been increasing concern about the commercial terms of such tech-
nology transfer, and the effect of the resulting "technology dependence"
on long term economic growth.
One consequence of this concern has been the substantial revision of
the industrial property and technology transfer laws of several Latin
American countries. Such laws regulate the registration, duration, and
enforcement of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and know-how, and the
license terms under which such industrial property rights may be trans-
ferred to a national enterprise from abroad.
A number of influential economists have been analyzing the financial
statistics and terms associated with technology transfer agreements in de-
veloping countries. Although there is no question that such technology
transfer has contributed significantly to industrial development and em-
ployment in such countries, the basic thrust of the criticism is concerned
with the economic side effects of such agreements. These side effects in-
clude both direct costs in the form of a mounting balance of payments
deficits, and indirect costs or "opportunity costs" in the form of being
restrained from certain activities due to restrictive clauses in the technol-
ogy transfer agreements.
Such economic studies reinforce the widespread general dissatisfac-
tion with the activities of foreign corporations in developing countries,
which has been reflected in the increasing demand for public accounta-
bility for the technology transfer agreements between foreign firms and
domestic industrial organizations. This demand has resulted in the enact-
ment of national legislation providing for registration and approval of
such agreements by agencies in a number of important developing
countries.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW
Such legislation includes Mexico's 1973 Law on the Transfer of Tech-
nology, Argentina's 1974 Law No. 20794, Brazil's 1975 decree of the
National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), as well as the guidelines
established by Decision 85 of the Ancom Group.
The basic concern of such legislation is the fairness of the terms of
technology transfer agreements, and whether the technology proposed to
be imported is actually of benefit to the economic development of the
recipient country. The mechanism of enforcement of such legislation is
through the establishment of government agencies for the registration,
analysis, and approval of technology transfer agreements. Such agencies
are empowered to analyze the terms of the agreement, and the technical
content of the technology proposed to be transferred, and to determine
the suitability of the transfer under the proposed terms in view of the
overall economic development objectives of the nation. Those agreements
which are deemed to be not consistent with such objectives are refused
registration, and returned to the parties for redrafting. An agreement
which is not registered is denied legal enforceability in the country.
Some of the specific aspects of technology transfer agreements con-
sidered relate to the industry concerned, the price and payment terms for
the technology, and the restrictive terms in the agreement itself. Agree-
ments which foster technology transfer in high priority industries, such
as energy or capital equipment, are highly favored. Those which are con-
cerned with low priority industries, such as consumer products, are sub-
ject to stricter scrutiny, with generally lower royalty payment levels
being acceptable.
The price and payment terms for the technology are subject of par-
ticular attention. There has generally been the feeling in the developing
countries that imported technology has been "overpriced" as a means of
avoiding rigorously enforced profit repatriation and exchange regulation.
By inflating the cost of "technical assistance fees," and shrewd use of trans-
fer prices, some transnational corporations have been able to report a
better cash flow from their foreign investments.
The restrictive terms of the agreement, such as price-fixing provi.
sions, tying provisions, and territorial limitations, are also subject to
close examination. There is considerable concern over many unduly re-
strictive terms arising from a general feeling in developing countries of
the inadequate negotiating position of relatively small national enterprises
when dealing with large multinational corporations. In many instances,
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national enterprises felt they had no alternative but to accept the terms
offered by the multinational company, even though such terms may have
appeared not to have met the standards set forth in U.S. antitrust laws.
In this sense, one of the important practical advantages of the new tech-
nology transfer legislation is the reinforcement of the bargaining position
of the national company by requiring approvement of the agreement by
the technology transfer agency.
Although the operation of many of the technology transfer agencies
is but a year or two old, the international business community has, in
general, actively protested against such legislation, predicting that strict
enforcement of such technology transfer laws would virtually stop invest-
ment and technological transfer to such countries. Preliminary statistics
concerning new direct foreign investment in the Ancom Group countries
seem to demonstrate such a trend.
The basic intent of the technology transfer legislation is a strategy
for long-term economic growth through an active discouragement of un-
favorable business arrangements while promoting growth in certain high
priority areas. More significantly, the legislation aims at developing
an indigenous technological capability while reducing "technological
dependency."
Technological dependency is really a consequence of the import
substitution development policies of the 1950s. The fundamental premise
of import substitution was to encourage manufacturing and assembly
facilities in the developing countries, that is, to substitute imports with
nationally produced goods. To that extent the development policy was a
success; however, a new type of "import" was created-know-how and
technology. At first, the cost of such imports was insubstantial compared
with the imports of producer goods. By the late 1960s, as import sub-
stitution was more fully realized, the cost of technology imports became
increasingly noticeable, and is now estimated to range between $800 mil.
lion and $1 billion in Latin America alone. The rapid growth of the cost
of technology imports is typified by the annual statistics from Brazil shown
in Table I.
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TABLE I
Brazil's External Payments for Royalties, Patents
and Technical Assistance 1968-1974*
Amount








*Source: Central Bank of Brazil
There are many aspects to the "technology dependency" issue. One
point holds that new technology and new products are developed abroad
and introduced into the domestic market with only a cursory considera-
tion of the needs, resources, and priorities of that domestic market.
Another, that research and development takes place primarily abroad,
encouraging a "brain drain" of educated nationals to R and D facilities
in developed countries. Finally, that the investment or distributorship
agreements are structured so as to discourage competition. The end
result of such a situation is a dependence on foreign technology, and lack
of an indigenous technological capability.
One of the essential goals of almost all economic development plans
in Latin America is the development of R and D facilities and programs.
Just as high tariffs discouraged the importation of foreign goods, the new
technology transfer laws are expected to discourage the importation of
technology. And just as investment incentive programs encouraged the
development of manufacturing facilities, it is hoped that similar research
incentive programs will encourage the development of research labora-
tories. Only when faced with increasingly less desirable alternatives do
the costs and risks involved with such ventures become more acceptable,
as ITT recently concluded in establishing a new research and develop-
ment facility in Chile.
Perhaps one of the most important outcomes of the new technology
transfer legislation is the realization that trade in technology is not a
mere commercial issue, but is an important political issue in the national
framework for growth and development. Although the multinational cor-
porations may possess the capital and technology necessary for economic
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development, they often forget that the developing countries possess a
priceless bargaining instrument- their national sovereignty. Although
one may question the wisdom of the newly emerging "technology substi-
tution" policies, they do express the national aspirations of the people of
the developing countries.
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